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Abstract
Imperfectly competitive macroeconomic models typically assume a symmetric equilibrium
with identical firms, despite the fact that most industries are characterised by substantial
degrees of firm heterogeneity. We examine how inter-firm efficiency gaps affect fiscal policy
effectiveness under monopolistic competition.
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11.  Introduction
Recent developments in macroeconomics have formalised the market-power foundations of
macroeconomic policy effectiveness1. All these studies assume a symmetric equilibrium with
identical firms. Inter-firm differences in performance and market shares, however, are a
distinguishing feature of real world industries, as reported for example by Cubbin and
Geroski (1987), Mueller (1990) and Oulton (1998).
This paper shows how relaxing the special assumption of symmetry affects the
standard conclusions on fiscal policy effectiveness under monopolistic competition. Within a
simple macromodel, where monopolistically competitive firms are characterised by
heterogeneous costs2, we show that when incumbents are more efficient than entrants the
efficiency gap between firms can be sufficiently large to reduce the fiscal multiplier
significantly, or even make it negative. Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3 derives the
effects of a balanced budget fiscal expansion and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The model
The basic structure of the model is similar to Dixon and Lawler (1996), with three types of
agents: households, firms and a government.
2.1. Households
There are a large number of identical households each with (i) a homothetic utility over a
composite, horizontally differentiated good C and leisure (1–Ls), where Ls is labour supply
and the time endowment is normalised to unity; and (ii) a CES sub-utility over varieties.  The
first stage of utility maximisation consists of choosing C and Ls to maximise
αα )L1(C)L,C(u s1s −= −  subject to the budget constraint TWLPC s −+= Π , where P is the
consumer price index for the CES consumption quantity index C,  W is the nominal wage
2rate,  Π  is nominal profit share, and T is a lump-sum tax.  The number of households is
normalised to unity, and the resulting labour supply and consumption demand functions are
given by,
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There is a continuum of potential varieties of the horizontally differentiated good
indexed by j∈[0, n].  The interval [0, n] represents the ‘mass’ of available varieties and for
expositional simplicity henceforth n shall be referred to as the ‘number’ of varieties produced
in the industry.  The second stage of utility maximisation then is to choose cj  to maximise
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, where cj  and
jP  are consumption and price of a typical variety j, ε>1  is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties, and the price index P is defined as
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where λ is a constant parameter that reflects the extent to which the CES quantity and price
indices explicitly incorporate the so-called ‘love of variety’.  0≤λ≤1, and  λ=0 and λ=1
correspond to the two extreme cases of ‘no love’ and ‘maximum love’.  It is straightforward to
show that the resulting demand for variety j, is  ( )Cn
P
P
c 1
j
j
−
−
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=
λ
ε
 − see Benassy (1996) for
details.
32.2. Government
Government consumption, G, consists of a composite index of the differentiated varieties
produced in the economy which is assumed to be financed by the lump-sum tax T paid by
households3.  The government budget constraint is given by   ( ) TPGdjgPn
j
jj ==∫
=0
, where
we assume that the government pays the same price as that paid by consumers.
2.3. Firms
It follows from the above that the demand function facing a typical firm is
( )Yn
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P
y 1jj
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λ
ε
,            (4)
where jy  is private and public demand for the brand produced by the firm, jjj gcy += , and
Y  is the aggregate demand for output, GCY += .
Each firm uses an increasing returns to scale technology which gives rise to the
incentive to specialise in the production of one single variety. Labour is assumed to be the
only factor of production, and to be perfectly mobile between firms, so all firms pay a
common wage rate, W. Setting W=1 (using leisure as the numeraire), the total cost function of
a representative firm j is given by its labour demand, φβ += jjdj yL , where βj and φ are
constants denoting the marginal and fixed labour requirements, respectively. Departing from
the existing literature,  we assume that, whilst having identical fixed costs, firms differ in
their labour productivity. This is captured by βj being  a firm-specific parameter according to
which firms can be ranked.
A function ρ(j) can be defined to capture this ranking.  In particular, we (i) impose a
strictly monotonic ranking and let 0)j( >′ρ  for all j≥0; (ii) assume that successive entrants
are less efficient than incumbents; and (iii) use an efficiency distribution with only one firm
4per efficiency level4.  The endogenous determination of the equilibrium mass of firms will
entail the determination of the industry ‘efficiency cut-off point’, i.e. the efficiency of the
marginal firm in the industry. Given the assumed distribution, a larger equilibrium number of
firms will correspond to a higher marginal cost of the marginal firm in the industry and to a
lower average industry efficiency. The effects of entry in this model are consistent with some
of the empirical evidence reported in the literature (see the studies in Mayes, 1996).
Each firm j chooses its price jP  to maximise its profit Π j j j j jP y y= − +( )β φ ,
subject to the demand function in (4).  This implies the following optimal price rule
Pj j=
−
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.  Normalising the marginal cost by letting )j(1j ρε
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optimal pricing policy
)j(Pj ρ=   (5)
Clearly, this suggests that - for any given market structure - the industry is characterised by an
asymmetric equilibrium spectrum of prices, quantities, market shares and profits distributed
according to the value of  )j(ρ , with lower cost firms having larger market shares and higher
profits.
3. General equilibrium and the effects of a balanced budget fiscal expansion
Market structure is determined endogenously.  Because in equilibrium there should be no new
entry or exit, the last firm (j=n) will break even. Hence 0n =Π  and nρ  defines the cost
efficiency of the least efficient, or ‘marginal’, firm and thus represents the industry ‘efficiency
cut-off point’.  Clearly, 0j >Π  for all j<n since all firms whose marginal cost is lower than
n
1 ρ
ε
ε −
 will make positive profits.  Thus, contrary to the standard model, firm heterogeneity
5implies that positive profits persist in equilibrium for the non-marginal firms.  Using (4) and
(5), the marginal firm zero-profit condition implies,
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The total industry profit is ∫
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Also, in equilibrium both product and labour markets should clear.  We have already
incorporated the product market equilibrium condition. Labour market equilibrium requires
equating the labour supply given by (1) with total labour requirement, namely ∫
=
=
n
0j
d
j
s djLL .
To obtain explicit solutions, we assume an explicit functional form for the efficiency
ranking function, that is ρ(j)=jδ, with δ≥0, which satisfies our requirement; the size of δ
determines the degree of firms’ heterogeneity and the symmetric case is characterised by δ=0.
The model can be reduced to the following three equations,
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φεεεδλ =−−− YPn 1)1( .            (9)
Equations (7)-(9) correspond, respectively, to the price index in (3), the goods market
equilibrium condition Y = C + G, and the marginal firm’s zero profit condition in (6) into
which we have substituted for the rest of the endogenous variables from the other equations.
Note that we have used  ρ(j)=jδ and imposed the condition 1-δ(ε-1)>0.
Let )G;P,n,Y(  denote the initial equilibrium5 and suppose that 10,YG <<= γγ .
The effects of a balanced budget fiscal expansion are given by the following
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Upon examination (10)-(12) imply that:  (1) dY/dG depends positively on λ and negatively on
δ;  (2) dY/dG>0 as long as λ-δ(ε-1)≥0.  In this case, a fiscal expansion leads to entry since
dn/dG>0, and the price level falls.  P is affected by (i) the mass of varieties and (ii) the
efficiency composition of the industry.  When λ>0, an increase in n directly reduces the price
index.  Entry, however, reduces the average efficiency of the industry and results in ceteris
paribus increases in P.  Thus, for λ-δ(ε-1)>0 the ‘love of variety’ effect dominates the ‘firms’
heterogeneity’  effect and dP/dG<0 when dY/dG>0.  The sufficient condition for a negative
multiplier, 0
dG
dY
< , can be derived from (10)6 and is given by
)/11)(1(
)1/(1
1
1
εααγ
εαγλδ
ε
λ
−−+
−+
<<
−
+ . Thus:
Proposition 1: The balanced budget fiscal multiplier is more likely to be positive the
larger are ε  and λ and the smaller is δ.
A high love of variety (large λ) and a low monopoly power of firms (large ε) will offset the
increase in P resulting from the entry induced deterioration of the cost efficiency composition
of the industry.  For sufficiently small values of ε and λ, the latter effect will dominate,
leading to a negative multiplier7.
7In the basic setting considered by the existing literature, where there is no “love of
variety” (λ=0) and firms are homogeneous (δ=0),  (10)-(12) respectively reduce to  α=
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The output multiplier is a positive constant below unity, it is solely determined by
households’ preferences and is independent of the elasticity of substitution between varieties
(ε) and the initial size of the government (γ).  With homogenous firms, entry does not affect
the cost efficiency composition of the industry. Thus, given the absence of love of variety, a
fiscal expansion  - whilst inducing entry - will not affect the price index,
Instead, introducing love of variety and abandoning the assumption of identical firms
implies that while the multiplier may remain positive, its size becomes dependent on α, ε, γ
and δ.  In particular,
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Proposition 2: The output multiplier will exceed unity if the ‘love of variety’ effect more
than compensates the ‘inefficient entry’ effect.
Otherwise, there will be some degree of crowding out and it is in fact possible for the output
multiplier to fall even below that obtained in the basic case.
4. Summary and Conclusions
The effects of fiscal policy under monopolistic competition are not neutral to the inter-firm
homogeneity assumption which currently dominates the literature and relaxing this
assumption is likely to raise interesting theoretical issues. Within  a model which allows for
8as direct a comparison as possible with the existing literature, we show that - when
incumbents are less efficient than entrants - the efficiency gap between firms significantly
reduces the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
New avenues for research naturally suggest themselves. Inter-firm heterogeneity
questions the plausibility of assuming away strategic interactions between firms. Given the
persistence of supernormal profits in the long-run, interesting results may stem from
comparing the short-run and the long-run effects of government policy.  Most importantly, the
market structure effects of fiscal policy points towards the need to investigate the interaction
of macroeconomic and industrial policy.
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Notes
                                                
1
 See for instance  Mankiw (1988),   Startz (1989),   Molana and Moutos (1989, 1992), Dixon
and Lawler (1996) and Torregrosa (1998).
2
 See Montagna (1995) for the market structure effects of firm heterogeneity under
monopolistic competition.
3
 Proportional income taxation is analysed in Molana and Moutos (1992) and Heijdra et al.
(1998). We follow the standard textbook convention and do not consider agents’ benefit from
G. See Molana and Moutos (1989),  Startz (1989), Reinhorn (1998) and Heijdra et al. (1998)
for alternatives which allow for ‘useful’ government expenditure.
4
 One could easily extend this to allow for a ‘mass’ of firms to exist per type but this would
not affect the qualitative nature of the results.
5
 It can be easily shown that (7)-(9) yield a unique solution.
6
 From (10), the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for dY/dG<0 is λ+(1-δ)(ε-1)<0.
Thus, we need λ, ε and δ to satisfy: 0<λ≤1; ε>1; and  1+λ/(ε-1)<δ<1/(ε-1) which requires
1<ε<2-λ.
7
 Clearly, the likelihood of the multiplier being negative will be ceteris paribus higher when
λ=0.
